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         ABSTRACT 
We examine whether syndicated loans securitized through Collateralized Loan 
Obligations (CLOs) have more standardized financial covenants. We proxy for the 
standardization of covenants using the textual similarity of their contractual definitions. 
We find that securitized loans are associated with higher covenant standardization than 
non-securitized institutional loans. In addition, we show that CLOs with more diverse or 
frequently rebalanced portfolios are more likely to purchase loans with standardized 
covenants, potentially because standardization alleviates information processing costs 
related to loan monitoring and screening. We also document that covenant 
standardization is associated with greater loan and CLO note rating agreement between 
credit rating agencies, further supporting the relation between lower information costs 
and covenant standardization. Overall, our study provides evidence that loan 
securitization is related to the design of standardized financial covenants. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of borrower-specific financial covenants in monitoring credit risk has been well-
established in the accounting literature (e.g., Dichev and Skinner [2002], Christensen et al. 
[2016]). Prior studies show that lenders adjust the accounting definitions in covenants to alleviate 
agency costs and acquire timely signals of a borrower’s financial performance (e.g., Leftwich 
[1983], Beatty et al. [2002], Li [2010], Dyreng et al. [2016]). However, the extent to which the 
customization of covenant specifications varies across different types of lenders has received 
little attention in the literature. We investigate whether syndicated loans securitized through 
Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) have more homogenous and comparable (standardized, 
hereafter) financial covenants.  
CLOs are special purpose entities that purchase high-yield syndicated loans and use the 
principal and interest payments of these loans to issue new notes.1 Over the past fifteen years, 
CLOs have become the dominant institutional investor in syndicated loans, reaching a 70% share 
in the high-yield loan market with an annual issuance of CLO notes that exceeds $100 billion 
(Standard and Poor’s [2014]). Certain characteristics inherent to CLOs make these entities 
different from other non-bank loan investors. CLOs invest in large and well-diversified loan 
portfolios to shield their performance from idiosyncratic credit risks (Jobst [2002], Ayotte and 
Bolton [2011]). For instance, the average CLO invests in about 200 loans that are issued by 
different borrowers in various industries and rebalances the loan portfolio on a monthly basis to 
improve its performance.2 These characteristics suggest that while CLOs might engage in less 
                                                          
1 High-yield loans are issued to highly leveraged companies and are usually rated non-investment grade. Banks 
typically invest in 10% to 15% of a high-yield syndicated loan with the remaining amount being purchased by non-
bank institutional investors such as CLOs and hedge funds (S&P Leveraged Loan Market [2015]). 
2 The statistics on CLO portfolio size are derived from the CLO-i securitized portfolio database, which we also use 
in this study. To provide a comparison, based on the 2014 LSTA Trade Data Study, institutional loans were traded 
in the secondary market about 15 times per quarter in 2013, while the average securitized loan in the CLO-i loan 
trade database traded roughly 40 times per quarter in the same year. Also, based on descriptive statistics in Massoud 
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screening and monitoring on a per loan basis, they likely face greater total portfolio screening 
and monitoring costs than other institutional investors. 
While CLOs can rely on a variety of mechanisms to lower screening and monitoring costs, we 
anticipate that the structure of loan covenant specifications is likely to provide one such 
mechanism. We hypothesize that securitized loans have more standardized financial covenants 
because, relative to customized borrower-specific covenants, such covenants are likely to help 
CLOs screen and monitor their portfolios in a more efficient way. Although standardized 
covenants do not provide the precise default signals that customized covenants do, we argue that 
CLOs are willing to trade-off this precision to balance their high information costs associated 
with the monitoring and screening of their loan portfolio. 
First, as CLO portfolios include marginal loan investments covering a highly diversified set of 
borrowers and industries, portfolio performance exposure to borrower-specific credit risk is 
limited. Thus, collecting and processing information on customized covenants to assess loan 
quality is potentially more costly relative to the benefits of receiving precise default signals. 
Standardized covenants can help CLOs to alleviate the high information costs from portfolio 
diversification while still providing a default signal that supports monitoring activities. Second, 
as CLOs rebalance their portfolios on a monthly basis, investing in loans with customized 
covenants can increase CLO portfolio screening costs. Financial covenants with more 
standardized definitions require less data collection, which likely lowers information costs and 
thus overall transaction costs. Third, customized financial covenants can lead to more 
disagreements between the credit rating agencies that rate CLO loans and notes (e.g., Jobst 
[2002], Ayotte and Bolton [2011]). Greater rating disagreements increase CLOs’ information 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
et al. [2011] and Paligorova and Santos [2015], the average hedge fund with a credit strategy is estimated to invest 
in about 60 to 70 loans. 
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costs, whereas standardized financial covenants with more similar specifications likely facilitate 
more comparable credit rating assessments.3  
We test our hypothesis using a sample of 3,303 complete financial covenant definitions in 440 
securitized and 703 non-securitized high-yield loan contracts issued over the 2000-2009 period. 
We obtain data on loan securitizations from CLO-i, a global platform that collects detailed 
information on CLO loan portfolios, and data on high-yield institutional loans from LPC 
DealScan. We match these databases with firms’ SEC filings on EDGAR to retrieve the specific 
loan contracts and hand-collect their covenant definitions.  
We employ a novel content analysis approach to proxy for the standardization of financial 
covenants by measuring the textual similarity of their contractual definitions. We compute the 
cosine textual similarity between covenant definitions using a vector space model applied by 
plagiarism algorithms (e.g., Salton et al. [1975]) and recently introduced in the accounting and 
finance literatures (e.g., Brown and Tucker [2011], Bozanic and Thevenot [2015], Hoberg et al. 
[2014]).4 We measure the covenant standardization of a loan by averaging the cosine similarities 
of its financial covenants with the same-type covenants of loans issued by other borrowers over 
the prior calendar year (Covenant similarity score). For loans with no financial covenants, we set 
the covenant similarity score to one (maximum cosine value), because the monitoring and 
screening costs related to the content of these covenant specifications are zero.5 We validate our 
covenant standardization proxy by showing that when loans and borrowers share similar 
                                                          
3 However, it is possible that CLOs do not heavily rely on covenants to monitor and screen their loan portfolios 
given that other CLO characteristics (e.g., reliance on credit ratings, diversification) and features of securitized loans 
might drive covenant standardization.  
4 We use the complete definitions of same-type financial covenants from two loans of different borrowers. We 
create two vectors with the number of times each word is mentioned in the two covenant definitions (excluding 
“stop-words”). The cosine of the angle between these vectors is the covenant similarity score, with values ranging 
from zero (no textual similarity) to one (identical covenant definitions). More details on the computation of the 
variable are discussed in Section 4.1 and Appendix A. 
5 Our results remain unchanged when excluding loans with no covenants (see Internet Appendix). 
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characteristics, financial covenants have higher similarity scores. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that securitized loans are associated with more 
standardized financial covenants relative to other institutional loans, controlling for borrower 
accounting performance and loan features such as the loan spread, collateralization requirement, 
and the presence of a loan rating that likely affect financial covenant standardization.6 In terms of 
economic magnitude, relative to non-securitized institutional loans, securitized loans have a 
covenant similarity score that is higher by about 20% of the variable’s sample standard 
deviation. We also document that covenant standardization increases (decreases) with the extent 
of CLOs’ (banks’) loan ownership, and that loans securitized at the time of origination (i.e., 
when CLOs are members of the primary loan syndicate) have greater covenant similarity than 
loans securitized ex post (i.e., when CLOs buy these loans in the secondary market). Overall, our 
evidence shows a positive and robust relation between loan securitization and financial covenant 
standardization.  
We next examine CLO portfolio characteristics associated with the covenant standardization 
of loans that CLOs purchase. We find that CLOs with more diversified loan portfolios are more 
likely to invest in loans with standardized covenants, suggesting that such CLOs are more likely 
to trade off the precision of customized covenants with covenant standardization that can offer 
some signal about loans’ performance and also serves to alleviate the high information costs of 
diversified CLOs. Moreover, we document that CLOs that significantly rebalance their portfolios 
are more likely to invest in loans with greater covenant standardization, potentially because 
standardization contributes to lowering these CLO’s high screening costs. Lastly, we find that 
standardization is related to greater agreement between S&P and Moody’s credit ratings on CLO 
                                                          
6 Loan investors could trade off covenant customization with greater loan spreads and accept standardized covenants 
that provide less accurate default signals than customized covenants. Our results suggest that, controlling for loan 
spreads, loans purchased by CLOs have more standardized covenants relative to other institutional loans.  
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loans and notes. This evidence suggests that covenant standardization can facilitate more 
comparable credit risk assessments, further supporting the lower information costs of 
standardized covenants. Collectively, our findings lend support to anecdotal evidence collected 
from discussions with CLO managers that commonly-defined financial covenants help them to 
quickly read and assess familiar covenant definitions. 
A few empirical caveats are in order. First, we acknowledge that our results document an 
association rather than a causal link between loan securitization and covenant standardization. 
Since we do not observe loan term sheets with covenant specifications before and after a CLO 
joins a loan syndicate, it is possible that an unobservable correlated omitted variable determines 
both CLO ownership of a loan and covenant standardization. While we attempt to address this 
issue in our sensitivity analyses, we cannot fully resolve it. Second, CLOs may rely on 
alternative loan-specific or third-party monitoring mechanisms to mitigate portfolio losses, 
which can also be correlated with covenant definitions. Thus, our empirical tests cannot 
completely rule out the possibility that CLO managers simply ignore debt covenants. Third, we 
cannot draw inferences on whether standardized covenants provide more or less credit protection 
to lenders relative to customized covenants, since our proxy only captures similarities in 
covenant specifications.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the growing 
research on the differences between securitized and institutional syndicated loans. While loans 
purchased by non-bank institutional investors include additional and more restrictive covenants 
(Drucker and Puri [2009]), more recent studies document a positive relation between CLO fund 
flows in the credit market and the issuance of loans with no financial covenants (i.e., “covenant-
lite” loans) over the 2006-2007 period (e.g., Shivdasani and Wang [2011], Wang and Xia [2014], 
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Becker and Ivashina [2016]). We add to these studies by showing that securitized loans have 
more standardized covenants. Thus covenant-lite lending might simply reflect an extreme form 
of covenant standardization that is an inherent characteristic of securitized loans. We further 
provide evidence that high information collection and processing costs related to CLO portfolio 
monitoring and screening is associated with the presence of standardized covenants. Our findings 
contrast with prior evidence that other institutional loan investors, such as banks and insurance 
companies, prefer customized covenants (e.g., Leftwich [1983], El-Gazaar and Pastena [1990]), 
and support the theoretical arguments on the standardization of securitized loan contracts (e.g., 
Jobst [2002], Ayotte and Bolton [2011], Triantis [2013]). Our setting also allows us to provide 
new evidence that is consistent with the arguments in Skinner [2011] that loan investors’ 
monitoring costs affect the design of accounting-based covenants. 
Second, we contribute to the emerging literature that examines CLOs’ loan investment 
decisions (e.g., Benmelech, Dlugosz and Ivashina [2012], Bord and Santos [2014], Loumioti and 
Vasvari [2016]). We show that, by purchasing loans whose covenant specifications are 
standardized, CLOs trade off loan features that facilitate better monitoring with features that 
decrease the high information costs which arise from their business model. Our findings are also 
relevant to studies documenting that CLO ownership influences loan contract terms such as the 
loan spread and size (e.g., Ivashina and Sun [2011], Nadauld and Weisbach [2012]).   
Finally, we expand the well-established literature on the determinants of the structure of 
covenant packages that improve contracting efficiency. Prior studies document that the choice of 
different covenant types is driven by a cost-benefit analysis of how covenant mechanisms lower 
agency costs (e.g., Dichev and Skinner [2002], Christensen and Nikolaev [2012], Ball et al. 
[2015], Dey et al. [2015]). Also, the design of covenant packages and their specifications is 
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shown to be affected by the quality and reliability of the underlying accounting information (e.g., 
Demerjian [2011], Brown [2016], Demerjian et al. [2016]) as well as by loan- and borrower-
specific characteristics (e.g., Beatty et al. [2002], Beatty et al. [2008], Li [2010], Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman [2011], Li [2015], Dyreng et al. [2016]). We provide evidence consistent 
with efficient contracting by showing that covenant specifications vary across different types of 
lenders. We thus respond to the call for more empirical work on factors that explain covenant 
design choices (Armstrong et al. [2010], Christensen et al. [2016]).  
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development  
2.1 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
Over the past fifteen years, the advent of CLOs has been the most significant development in 
the syndicated loan market (Standard and Poor’s [2014]). CLOs are set up by a bank and an 
independent investment management firm (typically called the CLO manager) to invest in small 
tranches of syndicated loans (typically called CLO loans or securitized loans).7 These loans are 
used as collateral to issue new senior and junior notes (typically called CLO notes) that are 
bought by banks and non-bank institutional investors (e.g., hedge funds, insurance firms). CLO 
loans and notes are rated by at least two credit rating agencies (i.e., Moody’s, Standard and 
Poor’s, or Fitch) to reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors.  
Several structural features differentiate CLOs from other non-bank institutional loan 
investors. First, CLOs invest in large, well-diversified loan portfolios to mitigate individual 
borrowers’ idiosyncratic credit risks. A typical CLO portfolio in our sample includes small 
tranches of about 200 loans issued by different borrowers in 15 to 25 industries. The average 
                                                          
7 Some of the biggest CLO managers in terms of CLO principal value under management are the Carlyle Group, 
GSO Capital Partners (part of the Blackstone Group), Alcentra, Ares Management, Highland Capital Management, 
and Credit Suisse Asset Management. As of mid-2013, these firms managed CLOs with a total par value of roughly 
$100 billion (Creditflux CLO Manager Rankings). 
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CLO size is $500-$600 million, and the average loan tranche size held by a CLO is about $2.5 
million. Portfolio diversification thus reflects a variety of industries and borrowers. 
Second, relative to some institutional loan investors that are passive (e.g., loan mutual funds), 
CLOs are actively managed, suggesting that CLO managers have the fiduciary duty to monitor 
their portfolio loan quality. To enhance portfolio performance, managers have the discretion to 
sell loans with deteriorating risk profiles or those that are expected to underperform in the future 
and replace them with new loans purchased in the primary or the secondary syndicated loan 
market. Peristiani and Santos [2015] document that, during the two year period after their 
origination, CLOs sell about 30.0% of their initial loan investments, while their monthly 
purchase activity is 5.5% of their portfolio balance. 
Third, CLO managers are required to comply with portfolio performance tests that are 
reported to CLO investors on a monthly basis. These tests are determined at the CLO’s 
origination and aim to impose certain standards on the portfolio’s structure in terms of loan 
riskiness and quality. For example, CLO managers are required to maintain a minimum average 
loan rating or a maximum portfolio exposure to an industry. Most importantly, CLO managers 
must ensure that the value of the portfolio loans covers the principal value of the CLO notes. 
This so-called “overcollateralization test” captures a CLO’s solvency by measuring whether the 
CLO has enough performing loans to repay its senior and junior notes. Portfolio loans that are in 
default or have a low rating are heavily discounted in the computation of the CLO portfolio’s 
value, potentially leading to a violation of the overcollateralization test (Loumioti and Vasvari 
[2016]). Such a violation decreases CLO managers’ compensation and could trigger their 
dismissal or the early liquidation of the CLO by its investors (e.g., Gapstow Report [2014]). 
Also, technical loan defaults could lead to the acceleration of loan principal and of other loans (if 
cross-default provisions are present), which might negatively affect a CLO’s cash flows. 
To pass the overcollateralization and other portfolio performance tests, CLO managers engage 
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in critical loan screening and monitoring activities. Discussions with several CLO managers 
indicate that when managers invest in a new loan, in addition to ratings information, they also 
rely on information from their own due diligence which includes details about the borrowing 
firm and the lending agreement as well as an evaluation of the financial covenants in the loan’s 
term sheet. In particular, the CLO managers mentioned that they prefer term sheets with 
commonly defined financial covenants because such definitions help them to quickly assess the 
underlying covenant specifications and characteristics. Over the loan ownership period, CLO 
managers also rely on financial covenants to monitor the loans. These covenants provide early 
signals of credit risk deterioration that allows the managers to trade loans ahead of significant 
credit events. While CLOs could rely on loan ratings to mitigate portfolio losses, as alluded to 
previously, ratings might provide a less timely signal of credit problems relative to covenants. 
2.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We hypothesize that securitized loans have more standardized financial covenants. We argue 
that, in contrast to customized borrower-specific definitions, standardized financial covenant 
definitions can be an effective mechanism that mitigates the information costs (i.e., the collection 
and processing costs of borrower-specific accounting data) pertaining to portfolio loans. Several 
factors specific to CLOs support our hypothesis. First, as noted above, CLO managers are 
required to monitor loan performance to meet regular portfolio performance tests. Given CLO 
portfolios’ significant diversification, the presence of customized covenants in securitized loan 
contracts could amplify monitoring costs, since managers would need to collect and process a 
significant amount of borrower-specific information. Also, the collection and processing of 
information on customized covenants to assess loan quality is likely more costly relative to the 
benefits of receiving precise default signals. Hence, standardized financial covenants can 
potentially alleviate information costs in loan monitoring.  
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Second, the substantial rebalancing of CLO portfolios induces significant screening costs. 
These costs are higher when financial covenant specifications are customized as CLO managers 
must make a greater effort to analyze financial covenants with which they are unfamiliar and 
process the larger and more diverse set of accounting data associated with these covenant 
specifications. This can adversely impact the timeliness or even the execution of CLOs’ portfolio 
rebalancing choices (e.g., Amihud and Medelson [1986]). Therefore, more standardized 
covenants are also likely to mitigate the information costs related to loan screening and thus 
reduce overall transaction costs. 
Third, standardized financial covenants can potentially facilitate more homogenous loan and 
CLO note ratings, further contributing to a reduction in CLOs’ information costs. Credit rating 
agencies follow a fairly standardized process in order to rate CLO loans and notes. Each loan in 
the portfolio is assigned an expected default probability based on the historical performance data 
of a large sample of similar and comparable loans and borrowers (Benmelech and Dlugosz 
[2009]). This makes it more difficult for loans with customized covenant definitions to be 
benchmarked and evaluated against other loans, exacerbating the information processing costs of 
credit rating agencies and likely contributing to greater disagreement in their rating assessments 
of CLO loans and notes. In turn, rating disagreements can magnify CLO managers’ information 
costs when monitoring loan portfolios, trading loans, or selling CLO notes to investors.  
Nevertheless, the securitization of syndicated loans might not necessarily be associated with 
more standardized financial covenant specifications. CLOs buy only a fraction of a high-yield 
syndicated loan (i.e., one or more CLOs will buy small-sized loan tranches). The remaining loan 
portion is bought by other syndicate lenders such as hedge funds or other institutional funds. The 
managers of these funds could prefer customized covenants in order to receive more precise 
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default signals, which allows them to trade in the equity market in a more timely manner (e.g., 
Massoud et al. [2011], Ivashina and Sun [2011]). Also, CLO managers are sophisticated loan 
investors and might not prefer to forego the more precise default signals that borrower-specific 
customized financial covenants offer; alternately, they could rely entirely on alternative 
mechanisms to alleviate high portfolio monitoring and rebalancing costs (e.g., credit rating 
agencies or other loan terms). Overall, these arguments suggest that the relation between loan 
securitization and covenant standardization is an open empirical question. 
3. Sample selection 
We obtain data on securitized syndicated loans from the CLO-i database provided by 
Creditflux, a global news platform that has covered CLO issuance and performance starting from 
January 2008. Creditflux retrieves data from monthly CLO reports, including loan-level data on 
CLOs’ portfolio structure and trading activity (e.g., borrowers’ name, loan types, ratings, face 
amounts, maturities, and defaults). To obtain contract terms and covenant definitions for the 
syndicated loans in CLO portfolios, we first hand-match the CLO-i data with DealScan and 
Compustat. We identify a sample of 1,075 unique securitized corporate loans issued by 605 
unique public borrowers in 2000–2009.8 We then search borrowers’ SEC filings on EDGAR 
following the search procedure outlined by Nini et al. [2009]. We are able to retrieve the 
complete contracts for 440 securitized loans. 
To test whether securitized loans have more standardized covenant definitions, we compare 
them to a control sample of non-securitized institutional syndicated loans in DealScan that are 
purchased by other non-bank loan investors. Following Ivashina and Sun [2011], we classify a 
                                                          
8 Because CLO-i does not code unique portfolio loans, we hand-match loans in CLO-i and DealScan based on the 
borrower’s name, industry, country, loan type (e.g., term loan B, etc.), and maturity. This matching method has also 
been used in prior studies that report a similar securitized loan sample size (Benmelech et al. [2012]). The 
securitized loan sample includes loans with CLOs in their original syndicate and loans purchased by CLOs in the 
secondary loan market.  
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loan as institutional if it includes at least one term loan tranche B-H (i.e., institutional investors 
typically purchase term loans B-H, while banks usually hold revolving or term loan A tranches), 
but does not include a CLO in its primary syndicate structure and is not identified in CLO-i.9 For 
term loans whose seniority is not identified in DealScan (i.e., the facility loan type is listed 
simply as “term loan”), we classify them as institutional if their average LIBOR spread is higher 
than 250 basis points or are sold in the institutional market. The “market segment” field for these 
loans in DealScan is classified as: “(highly) leveraged,” “institutional,” “LBO,” or “non-
investment grade.” Based on these filters, the total number of non-securitized institutional loans 
issued by public US borrowers in DealScan is 4,595 in 2000-2009. We eliminate institutional 
loans with a small institutional tranche that are distributed mainly to banks by requiring that 
more than half of the loan amount is sold to institutional investors. This results in 2,599 loans 
with high institutional ownership. We are able to retrieve the contracts of 703 of these 
institutional loans from the SEC filings in EDGAR. Therefore, our final sample includes 1,143 
unique loans (440 securitized and 703 non-securitized institutional loans) issued by 806 
borrowers.  
Next, we hand-collect the complete definitions of financial covenants from the loan contracts 
in the final sample. We focus on financial covenants since they include less legal boilerplate 
relative to other covenant types.10 We identify 3,303 unique financial loan covenants in 987 loan 
agreements (1,355 and 1,948 covenants in securitized and non-securitized loans, respectively). 
We also find 156 loan contracts with no financial covenants (55 securitized and 101 non-
securitized loans, or 12.5% and 14.4% of securitized and non-securitized sample loans, 
                                                          
9 It is likely that we misclassify some institutional loans as non-securitized. This is because we can only observe 
CLO portfolios since January 2008. To alleviate misclassification bias, we follow Benmelech et al. [2012] and limit 
our sample to loans originated after January 2005 or 2006. Our results continue to hold (untabulated).  
10 Specifically, the S&P Loan Guide [2011] suggests that financial covenants are “highly structured and customized 
to a borrower’s specific condition” (pg. 23).  
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respectively). These descriptive statistics are consistent with the fact that only 8% of CLO 
portfolio loans are covenant-lite based on the merged CLO-i/DealScan dataset (untabulated 
summary statistics). We include in the definition of a financial covenant all the text in the 
contract that relates to that covenant. For example, when the “Interest Coverage Ratio” is defined 
as “EBITDA to Interest Expenses,” we collect the accounting definition for “EBITDA” and 
“Interest Expenses” as described in the contract, as well as the definitions of all accounting terms 
within the definitions of “EBITDA” and “Interest Expenses” (e.g., net income, leases, etc.). We 
categorize covenants into 12 types based on the DealScan classification.11  
Table 1 provides details on loan characteristics by year and covenant type for the 440 
securitized and 703 non-securitized loans in our sample. Panel A reports the total number of 
loans and the percentage of securitized loans by year. Consistent with the growth in securitized 
loan issuance, the number of securitized loans in our sample increases during 2000–2007 and 
then sharply drops. Panel B reports the number of financial covenants by type. While we find 
that certain financial covenants are more commonly used in securitized loans (e.g., maximum 
capital expenditures or leverage) or in non-securitized loans (e.g., minimum net worth), we show 
that covenant types are generally equally distributed across both loan groups. This implies that 
our results are unlikely to be driven by a specific covenant category.12 
4. Variable definitions and summary statistics  
                                                          
11 DealScan categorizes financial covenants in: “Max. Capex,” “Max. Debt,” “Max. Debt-to-EBITDA,” “Max. Debt-
to-Equity,” “Max. Debt-to-Net Worth,” “Max. Leverage,” “Min. Debt Service Coverage,” “Min. EBITDA,” “Min. 
Fixed Charge Coverage,” “Min. Interest Coverage,” “Min. Liquidity,” and “Min. Net Worth.” We acknowledge that 
the DealScan covenant classifications could overlap. We expect this potential misclassification to induce higher 
noise, biasing against finding statistically significant results. In a untabulated tests, we exclude from our analysis 
debt-related covenants that are likely coarsely defined by DealScan (i.e., “Max. Debt-to-EBITDA”, “Max. Debt-to-
Net Worth”, etc.), and our results are robust to this specification. 
12 Christensen and Nikolaev [2012] report that the median syndicated loan contract has 1.53 (1.02) performance 
(capital) financial covenants. Our sample loans have, on average, 1.49 (1.38) performance (capital) financial 
covenants. 
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4.1 THE COVENANT SIMILARITY SCORE 
We proxy for covenant standardization by the degree to which two covenants of the same type 
are defined using the same words. Specifically, we calculate the pairwise cosine textual 
similarity for the covenant definitions of the sample loans using a vector space model employed 
in computational linguistics (e.g., Salton et al. [1975]) and recently introduced in the accounting 
and finance literatures (e.g., Brown and Tucker [2011], Bozanic and Thevenot [2015], Hoberg et 
al.[2014]). Greater linguistic similarity should increase lenders’ familiarity with covenant 
definitions, thus potentially reducing the information collection and processing costs related to 
loan monitoring and screening. 
To calculate our proxy for covenant standardization, the text of each financial covenant is 
converted into a W x 1 vector, where W is the number of unique words in a financial covenant 
definition. We remove all stop-words (e.g., “and,” “a,” “the,” and “of”) from the covenant 
definitions. Each financial covenant vector is then matched to a same-type covenant vector from 
a loan issued by a different borrower in the prior calendar year. The previous year’s loan 
covenant definitions provide a natural benchmark since recent contracts are likely the starting 
point for new loan contracts.13 The angle between the word vectors (W x 1) of same-type 
covenants is the cosine textual similarity score for that same-type covenant pair. The cosine 
textual similarity score is a continuous variable with possible values ranging from zero (if two 
covenants share no common words) to one (if the definitions of two same-type covenants are 
identical).  
Each covenant generates T covenant similarity scores, where T is the number of same-type 
                                                          
13 In untabulated tests, we use as a benchmark the same-type covenants in (i) loans issued to different borrowers 
during the prior two and three calendar years, (ii) securitized loans issued to different borrowers over the prior 
calendar year and, (iii) loans issued to different borrowers and loan arrangers over the prior calendar year. The 
results remain robust to these specifications.   
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covenants in loans issued during the previous calendar year. If a loan has two covenants, A and 
B, it will have T(A) + T(B) same-type covenant cosine textual similarity scores, where T(A) and 
T(B) represent the number of loans issued during the prior calendar year with same-type 
covenants to A and B. We average the cosine similarity values of financial covenants at the loan 
level to estimate the covenant similarity proxy, the Covenant similarity score. For loans with no 
financial covenants, we code the covenant similarity score as one (i.e., the maximum value for 
cosine similarity), since these loans are perfectly comparable in terms of their covenant structure 
and thus the information collection and processing costs are zero. Excluding loans with no 
covenants leaves our results unchanged (see Internet Appendix). Appendix A provides a detailed 
discussion on the computation of the cosine textual similarity score and an example of how 
contractual specifications differ among covenants with higher and lower similarity.14  
Table 2 reports univariate statistics for the covenant similarity score. The mean covenant 
similarity score is 0.49. When we exclude loans with no financial covenants (covenant similarity 
score = 1), the mean (maximum) score drops to 0.37 (0.58), which is consistent with financial 
covenants’ not being boilerplate, i.e., identical across loans. Figure 1 shows the average covenant 
similarity score for our sample loans increases in 2000–2007 and drops over the 2008–2009 
period.15  
4.2 LOAN AND CLO VARIABLES 
4.2.1 Variables for loan characteristics 
                                                          
14 To alleviate the concern that our proxy captures textual complexity rather than standardization, we further control 
for the number of words in a loan’s financial covenants and our results remain unchanged (see Internet Appendix).   
15 The trend in covenant standardization is similar when we exclude loans with no covenants. Hence, this trend 
relates to, but is not identical with, the overall trend in the usage of covenants over time documented in prior studies 
(e.g., Christensen and Nikolaev [2012]). Consistent with Christensen and Nikolaev [2012], we find that the 
frequency of capital structure covenants in securitized loans is higher compared to that in non-securitized loans, and 
drops over the period 2000-2007 by a similar percentage, whereas the frequency of performance covenants in 
securitized and non-securitized loans is similar and stays relatively flat over time. 
16 
 
We proxy for loan securitization using an indicator variable of whether a loan is purchased by 
a CLO in the primary or secondary loan market (Securitized loan). We employ in our analyses 
loan characteristics that previous studies have shown to affect covenant design (e.g., Dichev and 
Skinner [2002]). First, we control for alternative mechanisms that lenders employ to assess loan 
quality and alleviate high monitoring costs by employing two indicator variables that reflect 
whether the loan is secured by the borrower’s assets (Secured) or rated by a credit rating agency 
(Rated). We obtain loans’ secured status and ratings data for the sample loans from DealScan’s 
LoanConnector online interface. We control for the loan LIBOR spread (LIBOR spread) as 
lenders could ask for higher spreads to forego the benefits of precise default signals. Second, we 
control for the loan arranger’s access to a borrower’s private information that likely affects the 
accounting specifications used in covenant design, using the ratio of the loan amount that a 
borrower raised from a loan arranger over the past five years to the total loan size raised by the 
borrower over the same period (Lending relationship). Third, we further control for coordination 
costs among syndicate participants that likely affect covenant heterogeneity by using the natural 
logarithm of the number of lenders in the primary loan syndicate (Syndicates). Relatedly, we 
control for whether a loan includes a revolving tranche (Revolving tranche), which is usually 
bought by banks that prefer more borrower-specific covenant designs (e.g., Sufi [2009]). Lastly, 
we control for the natural logarithm of loan maturity in months (Loan maturity), the natural 
logarithm of loan size (Deal amount), and the number of financial loan covenants (Number of 
covenants). We also control for several proxies for borrower accounting performance described 
in Appendix B. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our primary analyses. Thirty-eight 
percent of our sample loans are purchased by CLOs. The mean LIBOR spread is 254 basis points 
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(log-transformed values are shown) and the mean number of financial loan covenants is about 3, 
while 85% of our sample loans are rated and 76% of the loans are secured. The mean loan 
amount is $663 million, the mean maturity is about 5 years (log-transformed values are 
tabulated), and 57% of our sample loans include a revolving tranche. These descriptive statistics 
are consistent with those reported in prior studies using high-yield loan samples (e.g., Ivashina 
and Sun [2011], Benmelech et al. [2012]). In addition, sample loans are sold to about 9 syndicate 
lenders (log-transformed values are shown), and the mean lending relationship intensity is 0.23, 
consistent with the fact that institutional loans are issued to non-relationship borrowers and are 
largely distributed across investors (e.g., Li et al. [2015]).  
We report differences in the means of loan and borrower characteristics for securitized and 
non-securitized loans in Panel A of Table 3. The univariate results suggest that securitized loans 
have a statistically significantly higher covenant similarity scores (0.51) relative to other 
institutional loans (0.48). Securitized loans have a higher spread, more covenants, a larger 
syndicate size and are more likely to be secured. Also, borrowers with securitized loans are 
smaller and more levered. In Panel B of Table 3, we show that securitized loans have greater 
covenant similarity scores than non-securitized loans do across most financial covenant 
categories. 
4.2.2 Variables for CLO characteristics 
We employ several proxies for CLO portfolio features in our analyses. We use two proxies 
for CLO quarterly portfolio diversity: (i) the ratio of a loan balance in a CLO portfolio to the 
total CLO principal balance, averaged at the CLO-quarter level (CLO average loan holding 
amount) and (ii) the CLO’s portfolio diversification across different borrower industries (CLO 
industry diversification). Following Lamont and Polk [2002], we define CLO industry 
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diversification as the standard deviation of industry investment ratios (i.e., the number of loans in 
a Moody’s industry to the total number of loans in the CLO portfolio), averaged at the CLO-
quarter level. We use Moody’s industry classification as this is typically disclosed in CLO 
investor reports.  In Table 2, we show that the mean industry diversification of CLO portfolios is 
about 5%, while the average securitized loan balance in a CLO portfolio is 2% of the CLO 
portfolio’s principal value. Moreover, we proxy for quarterly portfolio rebalancing using the 
ratio of the total loan face amount traded by the CLO to its portfolio’s principal value, averaged 
at the CLO–quarter level (CLO portfolio turnover). The mean CLO portfolio turnover is 18% of 
its principal value. 
We measure the disagreement of CLO portfolio loan ratings among credit rating agencies 
using: (i) the probability that a securitized loan’s quarterly S&P and Moody’s ratings are the 
same, averaged at the loan-year level (Same loan rating) and (ii) the absolute value of the 
differences in S&P and Moody’s securitized loan ratings, averaged at the loan-year level (Loan 
rating difference). We average securitized loan ratings at the loan-year level because ratings at 
the loan level are highly stable over time. We proxy for credit rating agencies’ agreement with 
respect to CLO notes’ ratings using: (i) the probability of a CLO note receiving the same rating 
from S&P and Moody’s, averaged at the CLO-quarter level (Same CLO note rating) and (ii) the 
absolute value of the differences in S&P and Moody’s CLO note ratings averaged at the CLO-
quarter level (CLO note rating difference). We average CLO note ratings at the CLO-quarter 
level to better match the CLO reporting frequency (in untabulated tests, averaging CLO note 
ratings at the CLO-year level leaves our results unchanged). We define credit ratings as a scale 
variable with values from 1 to 22, where 1 = AAA, 2 = AA+ (or Aa1)…, and 22 = D. The mean 
probability of a securitized loan (CLO note) having the same rating from S&P and Moody’s is 
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43% (28%), while the mean difference in the securitized loan ratings (CLO note ratings) between 
the two credit rating agencies is about 1 notch (1.37 notches). Lastly, we employ in our analyses 
the CLO portfolio performance characteristics described in Appendix B.  
4.3 VALIDATION TEST 
Recall from Section 4.1 that our covenant standardization proxy is measured based on the 
underlying assumption that standardized covenants share more common words with other 
covenants in the same covenant category. We validate this proxy by examining its relation to 
borrower characteristics and loan terms. We expect a higher covenant similarity score if loans 
share similar terms and their borrowers have comparable characteristics. 
In Table 4, we report the results of the validation test. We find that loans share more similar 
covenant definitions when they are underwritten by the same loan arranger; have the same loan 
purpose and are rated by a credit rating agency; and when the LIBOR spread, the number of loan 
covenants, loan maturity, loan collateralization, and lending relationships are more similar, 
relative to other sample loans issued during the prior calendar year. Further, loans have more 
similarly defined covenants when their borrowers have comparable liquidity levels and are in the 
same industry. Importantly, loan covenant standardization is primarily driven by similarities in 
the underlying loan structure rather than in borrowers’ characteristics (i.e., when we control for 
differences in borrowers’ characteristics, the explanatory power of our test increases by only 
2%). This finding suggests that covenant standardization is likely driven by lenders’ concerns 
about generating more comparable and homogenous loan contracts. Overall, this validation test 
suggests that our proxy for covenant standardization captures similarities in loan contract terms 
and borrower characteristics that are reflected in similar covenant specifications.  
5. Research design and empirical results  
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5.1 SECURITIZATION AND COVENANT STANDARDIZATION 
We examine the relation between loan securitization and financial covenant standardization 
by using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model, where the dependent variable is our proxy for 
covenant standardization, the Covenant similarity score.  
Covenant similarity score = α + β1Securitized loan + β2Number of covenants  
+ β3LIBOR spread + β4Loan amount + β5Loan maturity  
+ β6Rated + β7Secured + β8Revolving tranche + β9Syndicates  
+ β10Lending relationship + β11Liquidity  
+ β12ROA + β13Leverage + β14Cash flow volatility + β15Size  
+ Fixed effects. 
                                                    (1)     
 
The primary independent variable of interest in equation 1 is an indicator for whether the loan 
is securitized (Securitized loan). Based on our arguments above, β1 should be positive. We 
control for loan contract terms and borrower financial characteristics that influence covenant 
design choices, as well as loan purpose (operating, investing, financing, other), year of loan 
origination, borrower industry (Fama and French 12 industry portfolios) and loan arranging bank 
fixed effects (57 unique lead banks) to capture differences in covenant standardization over time 
and across industries and loan arrangers.  
We report the results of this test in Panel A of Table 5. We find a positive and significant 
coefficient on the Securitized loan variable when controlling for loan characteristics (model (I)) 
as well as loan and borrower characteristics (model (II)), suggesting that securitized loans have 
more standardized covenant definitions compared to other non-securitized institutional loans. 
Specifically, in model (II), securitized loans are associated with a 0.04 higher covenant similarity 
score than institutional non-securitized loans, which represents about 8.16% of the mean 
covenant similarity score of the sample loans, or about 18% of its standard deviation.16  
                                                          
16 Our results are robust to the inclusion of legal counsel fixed effects, legal counsel-loan arranger fixed effects, loan 
arranger-year and borrower fixed effects, and when we exclude covenant-lite loans. Moreover, our results hold when 
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Given that the positive relation between loan securitization and covenant standardization 
might reflect covenant package choices rather than the underlying financial covenant definitions, 
in model (III), we further control for the extent to which the types of financial covenants used in 
a loan compare to the financial covenants of other sample loans issued during the prior calendar 
year (Pct. of same covenants). For each loan pair, the variable is calculated as the number of 
common financial covenants between the current loan and loans issued during the prior calendar 
year. We then average the number of same-type financial covenants across loan pairs at the 
current loan level and divide by the total number of financial covenants specified in the current 
loan. We continue to find a positive relation (marginally significant at the 10% level) between 
standardization and loan securitization. 
In terms of our control variables, we find that borrower performance and characteristics are 
largely unrelated to the covenant similarity score, suggesting that covenant standardization is 
primarily explained by loan contractual features. Secured loans have a higher covenant similarity 
score, indicating that lenders substitute the lack of borrower-specific idiosyncratic loan covenant 
designs with collateral requirements (e.g., Rajan and Winton [1995]). Related, loans with greater 
covenant standardization have a higher LIBOR spread (though this effect holds in only some of 
our models), suggesting that lenders are generally compensated for trading off the precise default 
signals that customized covenants provide. In addition, we present some evidence that loans 
from relationship lenders and with a larger syndicate exhibit lower covenant standardization, 
suggesting that access to the borrower’s private information and lenders’ coordination costs 
increase heterogeneity in covenant definitions. Also, loans with fewer covenants have higher 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
we match our sample of securitized loans on borrower and loan characteristics using a propensity score matching 
methodology, and when we use alternative approaches to measuring covenant similarity (see Internet Appendix). In 
untabulated tests, we find that our results hold when we solely focus on loans issued over the credit boom (2000-
2007) or the credit contraction period (2008-2009). 
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covenant similarity, consistent with information collection and processing costs increasing with 
the number of financial loan covenants. 
To mitigate potential correlated omitted variable bias and concerns related to our choices for 
the control loan sample driving our results, we perform a battery of sensitivity tests reported in 
Panels B and C of Table 5. First, in Panel B of Table 5, we re-estimate equation 1 using our 
control group of institutional non-securitized loans and the treatment sample of: (i) highly 
securitized loans (model I) and (ii) low securitized loans (model II). We measure the intensity of 
loan securitization using the ratio of the loan amount owned by CLOs to total loan size. We 
calculate the loan amount held in CLO portfolios by first estimating the total loan amount held 
across all CLO portfolios in a month and then averaging these amounts across time to smooth the 
monthly variations of CLO managers’ investments in an individual loan. The median CLO 
ownership is 61%, suggesting that loans, when securitized, are largely purchased by CLOs. We 
then split the sample of securitized loans into loans with above and below median securitized 
amounts.  
While we find that securitized loans exhibit higher covenant standardization relative to non-
securitized loans regardless of the intensity of CLO ownership, securitized loans largely sold to 
CLOs have significantly higher covenant similarity scores. Economically, highly securitized 
loans have covenant similarity scores that are 0.06 higher relative to non-securitized loans, which 
is about 15% of the sample mean covenant similarity score or 27% of its standard deviation. By 
comparison, loans that are not largely sold to CLOs have covenant similarity scores that are only 
0.03 higher relative to the non-securitized loans, representing about 7% of the mean covenant 
similarity score or 14% of its standard deviation (model II). The difference between the 
coefficients on Securitized loan in these two columns is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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We also examine the relation between high loan securitization intensity and covenant 
standardization by restricting our sample to securitized loans only to mitigate any influence from 
the control loan sample (model III). While our sample size significantly drops, we continue to 
find results that are similar, but of weaker statistical significance (at the 10% level).17   
Second, we examine whether covenant standardization in securitized loans differs based on 
bank ownership in these loans. Given their experience in underwriting loans and participating in 
loan syndicates as well as their other business activities, banks have access to borrowers’ private 
information, which allows them to evaluate borrower-specific covenant specifications with lower 
information costs. Consequently, we anticipate that securitized loans with many bank-owned 
tranches will have less standardized covenants.  
We estimate the ratio of the size of the revolving loan and term A tranches (as reported in 
DealScan) to the total loan amount, which are largely retained by banks. We use the tranche’s 
“market segment” or LIBOR spread to identify whether the tranche is sold to a bank when the 
loan type is unobservable. Specifically, if the market segment reported in DealScan is “middle 
market” or “investment grade,” we define the tranche as a “term loan tranche A.” If the market 
segment is unidentified and the LIBOR spread is below 180 basis points, we define the tranche 
as a “term loan tranche A.” Our independent variable of interest is an indicator variable for 
whether the securitized loan has above median bank ownership. In model (IV) of Table 5, Panel 
B, we re-estimate equation 1 within the securitized loan sample. We find that securitized loans 
with high bank ownership are associated with lower covenant similarity scores. Overall, the 
                                                          
17 In robustness tests, we examine the influence of loan arranger’s share on covenant standardization. We fail to find 
evidence that securitized loans with above-median loan arranger’s share have less standardized covenants. When we 
focus on loans with below-median loan arranger’s share, we continue to find a positive relation between covenants 
standardization and securitization. Overall, our evidence suggests that loan arranger’s share is unlikely to drive our 
results (see Internet Appendix). 
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results reported in Panel B of Table 5 provide additional evidence on the positive relation 
between financial covenant standardization and loan securitization intensity.  
Lastly, we examine whether our findings hold for both loans securitized upon origination (i.e., 
when CLOs participate in the primary loan syndicate and potentially have a say on the covenant 
structure) and loans securitized ex post (i.e., securitized loans purchased by CLOs in the 
secondary market). In Panel C of Table 5, we re-estimate equation 1 using our control group of 
non-securitized institutional loans and a treatment group of (i) loans securitized at origination 
(model I) and (ii) loans securitized ex post (model II). We find that at-origination securitized 
loans have a 0.06 higher covenant similarity score, while loans securitized after their origination 
have a 0.03 higher covenant similarity score. The difference between the coefficients across the 
columns is statistically significant (at the 1% level). Our results remain unchanged when we re-
estimate equation 1 while restricting our sample to securitized loans only and compare at-
origination securitized loans with loans securitized ex post (model III).18 Overall, the results in 
panels B and C of Table 5 lend further support to our hypothesis that securitized loans contain 
more standardized covenants compared to other institutional loans.  
5.2 COVENANT STANDARDIZATION AND INFORMATION COSTS 
5.2.1 CLO portfolio characteristics and information costs 
We next examine CLO portfolio characteristics that vary information collection costs and 
might affect the covenant standardization of securitized loans purchased by CLOs. Specifically, 
we focus on two features embedded in CLOs that likely influence information costs related to 
CLOs’ monitoring and screening activities: CLO quarterly portfolio diversification and turnover 
                                                          
18 Time to securitization likely affects the results of this test. If a loan is sold to a CLO shortly after issuance, the 
bank likely originated the loan to securitize it. However, if a CLO buys a loan long after its origination, then the 
relation between securitization and covenant standardization becomes weaker. Unfortunately, we do not have data 
on the time to loan securitization.  
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(see also Section 2.1). We anticipate that CLOs with more diversified portfolios and greater 
portfolio turnover will purchase loans with greater covenant standardization. We use an OLS 
model where the dependent variable is the average Covenant similarity score across all loans 
purchased by a CLO in a quarter (Covenant similarity score of purchased loans):19 
 
Covenant similarity score 
of purchased loansq = α + β1CLO average loan holding amountq-1  
  +β2CLO industry diversificationq-1 +β3CLO portfolio turnoverq-1 
   +β4CLO overcollateralizationq-1 +β5CLO portfolio ratingq-1  
  +β6CLO portfolio defaultsq-1 + β7CLO balanceq-1 + Fixed effects. 
 (2) 
The independent variables of interest are CLO average loan holding amount, CLO industry 
diversification, and CLO portfolio turnover (variables are described in Section 4.2). To alleviate 
the concern that CLO portfolio features and the average covenant standardization of portfolio 
loans are simultaneously determined, we measure the average covenant similarity score of loan 
purchases (rather than at the CLO portfolio level) in the current quarter, while we measure the 
CLO’s average investment in individual loans, portfolio diversification, and turnover in the 
previous quarter. We expect β1 to be negative and β2 and β3 to be positive. We control for CLO 
portfolio riskiness (CLO portfolio rating and CLO portfolio defaults), performance (CLO 
overcollateralization), and size (CLO balance) over the previous quarter. We further include 
fixed effects for year, CLO manager, and arranging bank to control for the different trading 
styles across CLO managers or arrangers and over time.  
We report the results in Table 6. We find negative (positive) and significant coefficients on 
CLO average loan holding amount (CLO industry diversification and CLO portfolio turnover). 
                                                          
19 Although the covenant data in our sample is hand-collected through 2009, we are able to expand the CLO-quarter 
level analysis to 2013 because most loans issued before 2009 continue to be in CLOs’ portfolios through 2013, i.e. 
the last year of CLO data available to us (375 loans, representing 85% of our total securitized loan sample). 
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Consistent with our expectations, we show that CLOs with portfolios that include small loan 
investments, that are largely diversified, or that are significantly rebalanced are more likely to 
purchase securitized loans with greater covenant standardization. Economically, a one standard 
deviation increase in CLO portfolio industry diversification and turnover increases the covenant 
similarity score of purchased loans by about 0.03 and 0.01 respectively, which represents 4.33% 
and 2.04% of the mean value for the average covenant similarity score of a CLO’s loan 
purchases (or 21.43% and 7.14% of its standard deviation). Also, a one standard deviation 
increase in the CLO average loan holding amount decreases the covenant similarity score of 
purchased loans by about 0.04, which economically represents 7.27% of its mean value or 
28.57% of its standard deviation. Overall, our evidence suggests that CLOs with more 
diversified, actively rebalanced portfolios purchase loans with more standardized covenants, 
potentially because standardization helps them alleviate high information costs in loan screening 
and monitoring. Our evidence further suggests that for these CLOs the benefits of receiving 
precise default signals could be lower than the information costs related to loan monitoring and 
screening.20 
5.2.2 Credit rating agency disagreements and information costs  
In our final set of tests, we explore whether financial covenant standardization assists credit 
rating agencies in their interpretation of financial covenants. Namely, we examine whether 
covenant standardization increases the likelihood of reaching similar credit risk assessments for 
CLO loans and notes. We test whether financial covenant standardization is associated with 
greater agreement between Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s CLO loan ratings using an 
                                                          
20 We use the introduction of CLO 2.0 in the first quarter of 2009 as an exogenous shock that likely amplified 
CLOs’ information costs. We find that “CLO 2.0” CLOs are more likely to purchase loans with more standardized 
covenants than CLOs originated in the pre-CLO 2.0 regime. We also find that CLOs sell loans within a two month 
period prior to entering technical default, suggesting that they are unlikely to be inattentive to loan covenant (see 
Internet Appendix).  
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OLS model where the dependent variables are Loan rating difference and Same rating (both 
variables are defined in Section 4.2):  
Loan rating agreement = α + β1Covenant similarity score + β2Number of covenants  
+ β3LIBOR spread + β4Loan amount + β5Loan maturity  
+ β6Secured + β7CCC-rated and below  
+ β8Revolving tranche + β9Liquidity + β10ROA  
+ β11Leverage + β12Cash Flow Volatility +β13Size + Fixed effects.  
(3) 
We expect β1 to be negative (positive) when the dependent variable is Loan rating difference 
(Same rating). Similar to equation 1, in equation 3 we control for loan characteristics and 
borrower financial performance upon loan origination and add year, industry, loan purpose, and 
arranger fixed effects. We also include an indicator for whether a securitized loan is rated CCC+ 
and below by at least one credit rating agency in a year (CCC-rated and below).  
We report the results of these tests in Panel A of Table 7. Consistent with our expectations, 
we find that securitized loans with more standardized covenants are associated with more similar 
ratings. A one standard deviation increase in our covenant similarity score increases the 
probability that S&P and Moody’s issue the same loan rating by 4.40% and decreases the notch 
difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings by 0.17 notches. These effects represent 10.23% 
and 18.25% of the mean values for Same loan rating and Loan rating difference, respectively.  
We further test whether financial covenant standardization is associated with greater 
agreement between S&P and Moody’s CLO note ratings. We use an OLS model where the 
dependent variable are the proxies for CLO note rating agreement at the CLO-quarter level, and 
the independent variable of interest is the average covenant similarity score of the loans in the 
CLO portfolio one quarter before (CLO covenant similarity score q-1): 
CLO note rating agreement q = α + β1CLO covenant similarity score q-1 
       +β2CLO overcollateralizationq-1 + β3CLO portfolio ratingq-1 
       + β4CLO portfolio defaultsq-1 + β5CLO balanceq-1  
       + Fixed effects. 
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                                                                    (4) 
As above, we expect β1 to be negative (positive) when the dependent variable is CLO note 
rating difference (Same CLO note rating). The control variables are similar to the ones used in 
equation 2. In Panel B of Table 7, we report the results of these tests. While we do not find a 
statistically significant effect when we use Same CLO note rating as the dependent variable, we 
find similar results to Panel A for CLO note rating difference. An increase by one standard 
deviation in CLO covenant similarity score decreases the difference between S&P and Moody’s 
loan ratings by 0.17 notches, which represents approximately 12.41% of the CLO note rating 
difference mean value. Overall, this evidence suggests that covenant standardization in 
securitized loans is associated with rating agreements and, in turn, to lower CLO information 
costs.   
6. Conclusion 
Using a hand-collected set of financial covenant definitions, we study whether loans 
securitized through CLOs are associated with more standardized financial covenant 
specifications. We expect that covenant standardization is one of the possible mechanisms that 
CLOs likely employ to alleviate the high information costs related to the monitoring and 
screening of their portfolio loans. Borrowing from the field of computational linguistics, we 
apply a vector space model to proxy for covenant standardization using the textual similarity of 
financial covenant definitions.  
We find that, relative to a benchmark group of non-securitized institutional loans, securitized 
loans exhibit greater financial covenant standardization. We also find that covenant 
standardization increases (decreases) with the extent of CLOs’ (banks’) loan ownership, and that 
loans securitized at the time of origination have greater covenant similarity scores than loans 
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securitized after their origination. We note that our results only document an association between 
securitization and covenant standardization, and we cannot rule out the possibility that CLOs 
also rely on alternative mechanisms to mitigate portfolio losses. In terms of CLO portfolio 
characteristics, we document that CLOs with portfolios that are more diversified or are actively 
rebalanced are more likely to invest in loans with standardized covenant specifications. This 
evidence suggests that CLOs are potentially willing to trade off the precise default signals that 
customized covenants provide with covenant standardization, which can offer a general distress 
signal and alleviate the high information costs in CLO portfolios. We also find that securitized 
loans with more standardized covenants and the CLO notes backed by such loans have more 
similar credit ratings, lending further support to the relation between lower information costs and 
covenant standardization.  
Our study provides evidence consistent with efficient contracting by documenting that loan 
contract terms are related to loan investor characteristics. Although our loan sample period ends 
in 2009, we expect our results to hold after 2009 given that the CLO market recovered to pre-
crisis levels by 2015, and recent regulations did not focus on the structure of covenants that 
CLOs should hold. However, a potentially interesting research avenue is to investigate the 
relation between securitization and covenant standardization as well as the effect of 
standardization on securitized loan liquidity during periods of credit distress or high regulatory 
scrutiny (i.e., when the trade-off between CLOs’ monitoring costs and benefits likely changes). 
We leave these directions for future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
Measuring cosine textual similarity  
We measure covenant standardization by assessing the degree of overlap in the vector of unique words 
used to define covenants. To do so, we first remove from the covenant definition all stop-words (e.g., 
“and,” “a,” “the,” “of”). Next, we estimate the extent to which two covenant definitions are similar by 
calculating the pairwise cosine textual similarity for all pairs of reduced-form (i.e., stop-words removed) 
financial covenant definitions based on a vector space model used in plagiarism software and search 
engine algorithms (see Salton, Wong, and Yang [1975]) as follows: 
 
• We count how many times each word is used in each covenant definition. This process creates two 
vectors with the number of times each word is used in the two covenants. To illustrate, assume we 
have two covenant texts, CT1 and CT2, with three words (W1, W2, W3) each. W1 occurs in CT1 2 times, 
W1 occurs in CT2 3 times, and so forth:  
CT1 = (2W1, 3W2, 5W3). 
CT2 = (3W1, 7W2, W3). 
• The cosine similarity of the two vectors above is a mathematical measure of how similar the two 
vectors are on a scale of [0, 1], with 1 being the outcome if the vectors are identical. For cosine 
similarities resulting in a value of 0, the covenant definitions do not share any or words because the 
angle between the word vectors is 90 degrees. The cosine similarity is computed as: 
cos Ɵ = CT1·CT2 / ||CT1||*||CT2|| = 0.6758, 
where the vector product is CT1·CT2 = 2*3 + 3*7+ 5*1 and the normalized vectors are computed as 
||CT1|| = sqrt(22 + 32 + 52) and ||CT2|| = sqrt(32 + 72 + 12). 
 
After computing all same-type pairwise cosine textual similarity scores across all covenant types in a loan 
compared to loans issued during the prior calendar year, we obtain a loan-specific covenant similarity 
measure by taking the average of the covenant similarity in a given loan.  
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To provide some intuition for the measure, using a Maximum Capital Expenditure covenant as an example, we visually compare a benchmark covenant 
specification to another covenant in our sample that exhibits i) high textual cosine similarity (around our sample mean) to the benchmark and ii) low textual 
cosine similarity (below sample mean) to the benchmark. Words shared in common between the covenant and benchmark are highlighted. 
Benchmark  Covenant  with high textual cosine similarity to benchmark 
"Capital Expenditures" means, for any period, without duplication, (a) the 
additions to property, plant and equipment and other capital assets of the 
Borrower and the Subsidiaries that are (or would be) set forth in a consolidated 
statement of cash flows of the Borrower for such period prepared in accordance 
with GAAP and (b) Capitalized Lease Obligations incurred by the Borrower and 
the Subsidiaries during such period. "Capitalized Lease Obligations" of any 
Person means the obligations of such Person to pay any lease of real or personal 
property, or a combination thereof, which obligations are required to be 
classified and accounted for as capital leases on a balance sheet of such Person 
under GAAP, and the amount of such obligations shall be the capitalized amount 
thereof determined in accordance with GAAP. 
“Capital Expenditures” means, for any period, the aggregate of all cash expenditures 
(including in all events all amounts borrowed for the acquisition, repair, improvement, 
substitution or replacement of any capital asset and all amounts expended under Capitalized 
Lease Obligations but excluding any amount representing capitalized interest) by the Group 
and its Subsidiaries during that period that, in conformity with GAAP, are or are required to 
be capitalized or otherwise included in the property, plant or equipment reflected in the 
consolidated balance sheet of the Group and its Subsidiaries; provided that Capital 
Expenditures shall in any event exclude amounts expended with insurance proceeds from 
the loss of or damage to property, plant or equipment or other capitalized assets reflected in 
the balance sheet of the Group and its Subsidiaries. 
“Capitalized Lease Obligations” as applied to any Person shall mean any lease of any 
property (whether real, personal or mixed) by that Person as lessee which, in conformity 
with GAAP, is accounted for as a capital lease on the balance sheet of that Person. 
Benchmark  Covenant  with low textual cosine similarity to benchmark 
"Capital Expenditures" means, for any period, without duplication, (a) the 
additions to property, plant and equipment and other capital assets of the 
Borrower and the Subsidiaries that are (or would be) set forth in a consolidated 
statement of cash flows of the Borrower for such period prepared in accordance 
with GAAP and (b) Capitalized Lease Obligations incurred by the Borrower and 
the Subsidiaries during such period. "Capitalized Lease Obligations" of any 
Person means the obligations of such Person to pay any lease of real or personal 
property, or a combination thereof, which obligations are required to be 
classified and accounted for as capital leases on a balance sheet of such Person 
under GAAP, and the amount of such obligations shall be the capitalized amount 
thereof determined in accordance with GAAP. 
 
“Capital Expenditures” means, with respect to any Person for any period, any expenditure in 
respect of the purchase or other acquisition of any fixed or capital asset (excluding normal 
replacements and maintenance which are properly charged to current operations and any 
transfer of inventory to leased gaming equipment consistent with the Borrower’s historical 
practices as set forth in the Audited Financial Statements) to the extent classified as a capital 
expenditure in such Person’s cash flow statement in accordance with GAAP. For purposes 
hereof, the purchase price of equipment that is purchased simultaneously with the trade-in of 
existing equipment shall be included in Capital Expenditures only to the extent the gross 
amount of such purchase price exceeds the credit granted by the seller of such equipment for 
the equipment being traded in at such time. Capital Expenditures shall exclude any such 
expenditure made to restore, replace or rebuild property to the condition of such property 
immediately prior to any damage, loss, destruction or condemnation of such property, to the 
extent such expenditure is made with insurance proceeds or condemnation awards relating to 
any such damage, loss, destruction or condemnation. Capital Expenditures shall exclude any 
expenditure made in connection with the closing of an acquisition pursuant to Section 
7.03(g) hereof. 
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APPENDIX B 
Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Loan Characteristics   
Covenant similarity score 
The average similarity score at the loan level of covenant i in loan k 
with covenant j in loan m only if i and j are of the same covenant type 
and loan m is issued during the last calendar year prior to loan k. See 
Section 4.1 and Appendix A for further details. 
Securitized loan Binary variable that equals one if the loan includes at least one securitized tranche and zero otherwise. 
Highly securitized loan 
Binary variable that equals one if the securitized loan has an above 
median CLO ownership (defined as the total monthly holdings of a 
securitized loan by CLOs averaged at the loan level to total loan 
amount), and zero otherwise. 
Securitized loan with high 
bank ownership 
Binary variable that equals one if the securitized loan has an above 
median bank ownership (defined as term loan A and revolving loan 
amount to total loan amount), and zero otherwise. 
Number of covenants The number of financial loan covenants, including net worth covenants. 
LIBOR spread The natural logarithm of all-in-drawn LIBOR spread (average across loan tranches, excluding fees). 
Loan amount The natural logarithm of the loan amount. 
Loan maturity The natural logarithm of loan maturity (in months). 
Rated Binary variable that equals one if the loan is rated, and zero otherwise. 
Secured Binary variable that equals one if the loan is collateralized, and zero otherwise. 
Revolving tranche Binary variable that equals one if the loan includes a revolving tranche, and zero otherwise. 
Lending relationship 
The ratio of total loan size a borrower took from the loan arranger over 
the past five years to the total size of the loans the borrower raised over 
the same period. 
Syndicates The natural logarithm of the number of participants in the loan syndicate.  
Pct. of same covenants 
The average number of the same financial covenants with other loans 
originated over the last calendar year to the number of financial 
covenants in the current loan. 
Same loan rating The probability that a securitized loan's S&P and Moody's ratings are the same, averaged at the loan-year level. 
Loan rating difference The absolute value of the differences in loan ratings that Moody's and S&P issue for a securitized loan, averaged at the loan-year level. 
Borrower Characteristics  
Liquidity Current assets to current liabilities. 
ROA Operating income to total assets. 
Leverage Long-term debt to total assets. 
Cash flow volatility The standard deviation of borrower’s operating cash flows over the last five years, deflated by total assets (in $million). 
37 
 
Size The natural logarithm of borrower’s total assets (in $million). 
 
APPENDIX B (Continued) 
Variable Definition 
CLO Characteristics    
CLO covenant similarity score The covenant similarity score of securitized loans in a CLO’s portfolio, averaged at the CLO-quarter level. 
CLO industry diversification 
The standard deviation of the industry investment ratios (i.e., the 
number of loans in a Moody’s industry to the total number of loans 
in the CLO portfolio), averaged at the CLO-quarter level. 
CLO average loan holding amount The ratio of the loan amount held by a CLO to CLO portfolio balance, averaged at the CLO-quarter level. 
CLO portfolio turnover The ratio of the total loan face amount purchased and sold at the CLO-quarter level to CLO’s portfolio balance.   
Same CLO note rating The probability of a CLO note receiving the same rating from S&P and Moody’s, averaged at the CLO-quarter level. 
CLO note rating difference 
The absolute value of the differences in CLO note ratings that S&P 
and Moody's issue for a CLO's notes, averaged at the CLO-quarter 
level. 
CLO portfolio rating 
The average portfolio loan ratings at the CLO-quarter level. Loan 
rating is a scale variable equal to 1 if the loan rating is "AAA," 2 if 
"AA+," (…), and 22 for "D."  
CLO portfolio defaults  
The ratio of the number of defaulted loans in a CLO portfolio to the 
total number of loans in a CLO portfolio, averaged at the CLO-
quarter level. 
CLO overcollateralization  The natural logarithm of a CLO’s overcollateralization test score, averaged at the CLO-quarter level. 
CLO balance The natural logarithm of the principal value of a CLO portfolio outstanding, averaged at the CLO-quarter level. 
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FIGURE 1 
Covenant similarity score 
 
 
Figure 1 presents the average covenant similarity score for our sample of 703 institutional non-securitized and 440 securitized loans 
over the 2000–2009 period (primary axis) which includes loans with no financial covenants (covenant similarity score=1). The pattern 
looks similar for the subsample of 608 institutional non-securitized and 385 securitized loans in 2000–2009, excluding loans with no 
financial covenants (primary axis). The figure also plots the percentage of securitized loans over time, which is estimated as the total 
number of securitized loans issued in a year divided by the annual total loan issuance (secondary axis).  
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TABLE 1 
Sample composition by year and covenant type 
    
Panel A: Loans and financial covenants by year  
Year Number of loans 
Percentage of 
securitized loans  
2000 93 15.05%  
2001 135 8.15%  
2002 90 20.00%  
2003 109 31.19%  
2004 120 42.50%  
2005 110 48.18%  
2006 139 53.96%  
2007 194 68.56%  
2008 96 23.96%  
2009 57 49.12%  
Total 1,143 38.49%  
    Panel B: Financial covenant types    
Covenant type  Number of covenants Securitized loans Non-securitized loans 
Max. Capex 387 232 155 
Max. Debt 69 27 42 
Max. Debt-to-EBITDA 212 74 138 
Max. Debt-to-Equity 99 12 87 
Max. Debt-to-Net Worth 69 15 54 
Max. Leverage 891 430 461 
Min. Debt Service Coverage 51 12 39 
Min. EBITDA 137 56 81 
Min. Fixed Charge Coverage 413 161 252 
Min. Interest Coverage 612 259 353 
Min. Liquidity 87 20 67 
Min. Net Worth 271 57 214 
Other 5 0 5 
Total 3,303 1,355 1,948 
This table reports sample composition by year and covenant type. We obtain data on loan securitizations 
from CLO-i, a global platform that collects detailed information on CLO loan portfolios, and data on high-
yield institutional loans from LPC DealScan. We match these databases with firms’ SEC filings on 
EDGAR to retrieve the specific loan contracts and hand-collect their covenant definitions. There are 3,303 
complete financial covenant definitions over our sample period (2000-2009). Panel A reports the number 
of loans and the annual securitized loan issuance (defined as the ratio of the number of securitized loans 
issued during a calendar year to the total number of institutional and securitized loans issued during the 
same period. Panel B reports the number of covenants by covenant category for the securitized and non-
securitized loans.  
  
40 
 
TABLE 2 
Summary statistics 
              
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
              
Loan Characteristics             
              
Covenant similarity score 1,143 0.49 0.22 0.37 0.44 0.51 
Securitized loan 1,143 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Number of covenants 1,143 2.87 1.60 2.00 3.00 4.00 
LIBOR spread 1,143 5.36 0.50 5.01 5.30 5.70 
Loan amount 1,143 19.83 1.11 19.11 19.76 20.53 
Loan maturity 1,143 4.02 0.38 3.74 4.07 4.33 
Rated 1,143 0.85 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Secured 1,143 0.76 0.43 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Revolving tranche 1,143 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Lending relationship 1,143 0.23 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.44 
Syndicates 1,143 1.81 0.91 1.10 1.95 2.48 
Pct. of same covenants 1,143 0.40 0.28 0.20 0.36 0.48 
Same loan rating  1,098 0.43 0.41 0.00 0.33 1.00 
Loan rating difference 1,098 0.96 0.90 0.00 1.00 1.00 
              
Borrower Characteristics       
              
Liquidity 1,143 1.58 0.64 1.14 1.66 1.69 
ROA 1,143 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.09 
Leverage 1,143 0.39 0.21 0.24 0.40 0.49 
Cash flow volatility 1,143 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Size 1,143 7.79 1.11 7.05 7.80 8.39 
              
CLO Characteristics (at the CLO-quarter level)       
              
CLO covenant similarity score 3,792 0.49 0.14 0.42 0.49 0.60 
CLO average loan holding amount 3,792 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
CLO industry diversification 3,792 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 
CLO portfolio turnover 3,792 0.18 0.22 0.03 0.07 0.25 
CLO overcollateralization  3,792  2.45 0.52    2.23   2.44   2.64 
CLO portfolio rating 3,792 14.99 0.79 14.52 14.82 15.28 
CLO portfolio defaults  3,792 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 
CLO balance 3,792 20.36 0.62 20.06 20.45 20.74 
Same CLO note rating 3,792 0.28 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.43 
CLO note rating difference 3,792 1.37 1.18 0.43 1.06 2.13 
       
 
This table reports the summary statistics of the variables for borrower, loan, and CLO characteristics used in 
our primary analyses. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels.  
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TABLE 3 
Loan, borrower, and covenant characteristics: securitized and non-securitized loans 
   
  
Panel A: Borrower and loan characteristics  
 Securitized Non-securitized t-stat. 
 Variables loans Loans 
    
Covenant similarity score 0.51 0.48 -2.03** 
 (0.20) (0.23)  
Number of covenants 3.10 2.70 -3.37*** 
 (2.20) (1.96)  
LIBOR spread 5.51 5.26 -8.31*** 
 (0.46) (0.50)  
Loan amount 20.10 19.65 -6.74*** 
 (1.15) (1.06)  
Loan maturity 4.10 3.97 -5.66*** 
 (0.26) (0.42)  
Rated 1.00 0.75 -12.16*** 
 (0.00) (0.44)  
Secured 0.94 0.65 -11.28*** 
 (0.25) (0.47)  
Revolving tranche 0.70 0.49 -7.27*** 
 (0.46) (0.50)  
Lending relationship 0.19 0.25 2.92*** 
 (0.35) (0.37)  
Syndicates 1.91 1.74 -2.97*** 
 (0.79) (0.97)  
Pct. of same covenants 0.41 0.39 -0.99 
 (0.26) (0.28)  
Liquidity 1.59 1.58 -0.38 
 (0.63) (0.64)  
ROA 0.07 0.06 -1.29 
 (0.05) (0.05)  
Leverage 0.45 0.34 -8.87*** 
 (0.22) (0.19)  
Cash flow volatility 0.03 0.03 -0.09 
 (0.02) (0.02)  
Size 7.62 7.90 4.05*** 
 (1.14)  (1.08)  
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Panel B: Covenant similarity score by covenant type 
        Covenant similarity score  
 
Variables 
Securitized  
loans 
Non-securitized 
loans 
 
t-stat 
    
Max. Capex 0.35  0.33  -1.99** 
 (0.12) (0.13)  
Max. Debt 0.32  0.39  1.97** 
 (0.11) (0.07)  
Max. Debt-to-EBITDA 0.41  0.40  -0.65 
 (0.06) (0.07)  
Max. Debt-to-Equity 0.34  0.33  -0.77 
 (0.14) (0.14)  
Max. Debt-to-Net Worth 0.26  0.27  0.69 
 (0.09) (0.07)  
Max. Leverage 0.47  0.44  -5.43*** 
 (0.07) (0.09)  
Min. Debt Service Coverage 0.30  0.27  -0.86 
 (0.07) (0.09)  
Min. EBITDA 0.42  0.39  -1.99** 
 (0.12) (0.14)  
Min. Fixed Charge Coverage 0.49  0.46  -2.74*** 
 (0.07) (0.08)  
Min. Interest Coverage 0.48  0.46  -5.07*** 
 (0.07) (0.07)  
Min. Liquidity 0.38  0.35  -2.02** 
 (0.06) (0.06)  
Min. Net Worth 0.25  0.23  -2.08** 
 (0.08) (0.06)  
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables and covenants examined in our analyses by securitized and non-
securitized loan samples. Panel A reports the mean values (standard deviation in parentheses) of borrower and loan 
characteristics. Panel B provides the mean values (standard deviation in parentheses) for the covenant similarity scores by 
covenant type. The last column in each panel provides t-statistics for the difference in means. All variables are defined in 
Appendix B. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level using two-tailed tests. 
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TABLE 4 
Validation test: determinants of covenant similarity score  
    
  
 Dep. Var. = Covenant similarity score 
Variables Prediction (I) (II) 
D(Number of covenants) - -0.13*** -0.13*** 
  (-14.50) (-14.79) 
D(LIBOR spread) - -0.02** -0.02** 
  (-2.13) (-2.10) D(Loan amount) - -0.01 -0.01 
  (-0.73) (-0.47) D(Maturity) - -0.06*** -0.05*** 
  (-3.42) (-3.21) Same loan arranger + 0.16* 0.11* 
  (1.90) (1.75) Same loan purpose + 0.09* 0.10* 
  (1.68) (1.67) Rated + 0.09*** 0.08*** 
  (4.22) (3.76) 
Secured + 0.07*** 0.06*** 
  (3.08) (2.56) 
D(Syndicates) - 0.01 0.01 
  (0.71) (0.33) D(Lending relationship) - -0.22*** -0.21*** 
  (-8.96) (-8.75) Same industry +  0.30*** 
   (3.26) D(Liquidity) -  -0.07*** 
   (-4.16) D(ROA) -  0.21 
   (0.97) D(Leverage) -  0.01 
   (0.17) D(Cash flow volatility) -  0.47 
   (1.18) D(Size) -  -0.01 
   (-0.27) Fixed effects  Yes Yes 
    
Adj. R2  56.76%  58.17% Obs.     1,143  1,143     
 
This table reports the results of the tests that examine the relation between covenant similarity and differences in loan contract and borrower 
characteristics. The dependent variable is the Covenant similarity score defined as the average textual cosine similarity of loan financial 
covenants compared to same-type covenants in loans to different borrowers originated in the prior calendar year. Differences, denoted by D(.), 
are estimated as the absolute difference between a loan or a borrower characteristic and the relevant average loan and borrower characteristics 
associated with other sample loans issued during the prior calendar year. Same loan arranger is defined as the proportion of loans that were 
arranged by the same loan arranger but were issued by different borrowers over the prior calendar year and have at least one same-type covenant 
compared to the current loan. Same loan purpose is defined as the proportion of loans issued by different borrowers over the prior calendar year 
that have same purpose (“operating,” “investing,” “financing,” “other”) and at least one same-type covenant compared to the current loan. Rated 
and Secured are defined as the proportion of loans issued by different borrowers over the prior calendar year that have similar rating status (i.e., 
rated or not) or collateralization status (i.e., secured or not) and at least one same-type covenant compared to the current loan. Same Industry  is 
defined as the proportion of loans issued by different borrowers in the same industry (12 Fama and French industry portfolios) over the prior 
calendar year that have at least one same-type covenant compared to the current loan. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. OLS 
regressions are used to estimate the models. Coefficient t-statistics are in parentheses. Fixed effects for year, industry, loan purpose, and loan 
arranger are included but not tabulated. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the borrower level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
and * indicates significance at the 10% level using two-tailed tests.
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TABLE 5 
Securitization and covenant standardization 
 
 
Panel A: Loan securitization and financial covenant standardization 
 
Dep. Var. = Covenant similarity score 
Variables (I) (II) (III) 
Securitized loan 0.04*** 0.04** 0.02* 
 (2.87) (2.44) (1.83) 
Number of covenants -0.05*** -0.05*** 0.01*** 
 (-12.53) (-11.93) (2.66) 
LIBOR spread 0.04** 0.03* 0.01 
 (2.33) (1.66) (0.62) 
Loan amount 0.01* 0.01 0.01* 
 (1.86) (1.00) (1.85) 
Loan maturity 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.01 
 (3.71) (2.80) (1.32) 
Rated -0.03* -0.04** -0.01 
 (-1.95) (-2.05) (-1.29) 
Secured 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.02** 
 (3.55) (3.73) (2.10) 
Revolving tranche -0.05*** -0.04** -0.01 
 (-3.59) (-2.38) (-0.87) 
Syndicates -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 
 (-4.29) (-4.08) (-3.72) 
Lending relationship -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03* 
 (-2.84) (-2.85) (-1.61) 
Liquidity  -0.00 -0.00 
  (-0.17) (-0.57) 
ROA  -0.03 0.04 
  (-0.25) (0.53) 
Leverage  0.09*** 0.01 
  (2.53) (0.54) 
Cash flow volatility  0.15 -0.00 
  (0.56) (-0.01) 
Size  0.01 0.01 
  (0.92) (1.31) 
Pct. of same covenants             0.67*** 
         (34.61) 
Fixed effects Yes           Yes           Yes 
     
Adj. R2   41.63%     45.63%    75.57% 
Obs.   1,143     1,143    1,143 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Panel B: Loan securitization and financial covenant standardization in loans with high CLO and bank 
ownership 
            
  Dep. Var. = Covenant similarity score 
  
Highly securitized 
and non-
securitized loans 
Low securitized 
and non-
securitized loans 
Securitized loan sample 
 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Securitized loan 0.06*** 0.03*   
  (2.92) (1.81)   
Highly securitized loan   0.04*  
   (1.86)  
Securitized loan with 
high bank ownership    
 
-0.05** 
    (-2.34) 
Number of covenants -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
  (-11.18) (-10.82) (-6.88) (-7.64) 
LIBOR spread 0.03* 0.03* 0.09*** -0.01 
  (1.62) (1.66) (2.84) (-0.14) 
Loan amount 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 
  (0.62) (1.58) (-0.07) (-0.91) 
Loan maturity 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05 0.04 
  (2.93) (2.76) (1.34) (0.99) 
Rated -0.03* -0.04*     
 (-1.83) (-1.90)     
Secured 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.09** 
 (3.38) (3.47) (0.36) (1.99) 
Revolving tranche -0.03 -0.04** -0.04 -0.02 
  (-1.48) (-2.42) (-1.44) (-0.54) 
Syndicates -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.00 -0.03* 
  (-3.01) (-3.12) (-0.69) (-1.64) 
Lending relationship -0.03* -0.02 -0.11*** -0.12*** 
  (-1.73) (-1.14) (-4.70) (-5.37) 
Liquidity 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.27) (0.06) (-1.47) (-1.10) 
ROA -0.06 0.06 0.080 -0.14 
  (-0.43) (0.45) (0.36) (-0.64) 
Leverage 0.09** 0.06 -0.011 0.09 
  (2.18) (1.56) (-0.52) (1.35) 
Cash flow volatility 0.28 0.16 -0.403 -0.10 
  (0.91) (0.56) (-1.01) (-0.23) 
Size 0.01 0.01 0.017 0.03** 
  (0.70) (0.19) (1.24) (2.18) 
Fixed effects   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
     
     
Statistical difference of 
coefficients: 
 
χ2 = 4.88, Prob.> χ2 = 0.04   
     
Adj. R2 47.92% 49.08% 43.07% 45.20% 
Obs.   923 923   440                  440 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Panel C: Covenant standardization in at-origination and ex-post securitized loans 
 Dep. Var. = Covenant Similarity Score 
  
Securitized loans at 
origination and non-
securitized loans 
Securitized loans after 
origination and non-
securitized loans 
Securitized loan 
subsample 
 
Variables (I) (II) (III) 
Securitized loan 0.06*** 0.03**  
  (2.70) (2.11)  
At-origination securitized loan   0.05** 
   (1.96) 
Number of covenants -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.04*** 
  (-10.92) (-11.12) (-7.36) 
LIBOR spread 0.05** 0.03 -0.01 
  (2.16) (1.40) (-0.27) 
Loan amount 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
  (1.31) (0.72) (-0.62) 
Loan maturity 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04 
  (2.89) (3.01) (1.07) 
Rated -0.03* -0.04*  
 (-1.79) (-1.85)  
Secured 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.09* 
 (2.91) (3.61) (1.86) 
Revolving tranche -0.02 -0.04** -0.04 
  (-1.22) (-2.30) (-1.42) 
Syndicates -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04** 
  (-2.71) (-3.57) (-2.46) 
Lending relationship -0.01 -0.04** -0.12*** 
  (-0.75) (-2.22) (-5.36) 
Liquidity 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
  (0.64) (-0.40) (-1.15) 
ROA 0.11 -0.09 -0.19 
  (0.81) (-0.60) (-0.80) 
Leverage 0.10** 0.07* 0.11* 
  (2.32) (1.68) (1.68) 
Cash flow volatility 0.28 0.12 -0.16 
  (0.90) (0.40) (-0.35) 
Size -0.00 0.01 0.03* 
  (-0.24) (1.17) (1.83) 
Statistical difference of 
coefficients: 
 
χ2 = 18.98, Prob.> χ2 = 0.00 
 
    
Fixed effects Yes    Yes    Yes 
    
Adj. R2 51.90% 46.22%  44.81% 
Obs.      828    1,018 440 
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This table reports the results of the tests on the relation between securitization and financial covenant standardization. In 
both panels, the dependent variable is Covenant similarity score, defined as the average textual cosine similarity of the 
financial covenants in a loan compared to same-type covenants in loans to different borrowers originated in the prior 
calendar year.  
 
In Panel A, we report the results on the relation between loan securitization and financial covenant standardization 
controlling for (i) loan characteristics, year of loan origination, loan purpose (“financing,” “operating,” “investing,” and 
“other”) and loan arranger fixed effects (column (I)); (ii) the variables in column (I) and borrower characteristics and 
borrower’s industry fixed effects (i.e., 12 Fama and French industry portfolios) (column (II)); and (iii) the variables in 
column (II) and Pct. of same covenants, defined as the average number of the same financial covenants with other loans 
originated in the past calendar year to the number of the loan’s financial covenants (column III). All other variables are 
defined in Appendix B.  
 
In Panel B, to alleviate the concern that our findings are driven by an omitted loan characteristic, not securitization, we 
compare non-securitized loans with securitized loans with above median (column I) and below median (column II) CLO 
ownership. The statistical significance of the difference in the coefficients on Securitized loan is reported. In columns 
(III) and (IV), we restrict our sample to securitized loans only. In specification (III), the independent variable of interest 
is Highly securitized loan, which equals one if the securitized loan has an above median CLO ownership (defined as the 
total monthly holdings of a securitized loan by CLOs averaged at the loan level to total loan amount), and zero otherwise. 
In column (IV), the independent variable of interest is Securitized loan with high bank ownership, defined as one if the 
securitized loan has an above median bank ownership (defined as term loan A and revolving loan amount to total loan 
amount), and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Fixed effects for year of loan origination, 
Fama and French’s 12 industry portfolios, loan purpose (“financing,” “operating,” “investing,” and “other”) and loan 
arranger are included but not tabulated.  
 
In Panel C, we report the results for the tests on the effect of the timing of loan securitization on covenant 
standardization. We compare at-origination securitized loans (i.e., loans that CLOs participate in their primary syndicate) 
and loans securitized in the secondary market (i.e., ex post). The dependent variable is Covenant similarity score, defined 
as the average textual cosine similarity of the financial covenants in a loan compared to same-type covenants in loans to 
different borrowers originated in the prior calendar year. We compare non-securitized loans with at-origination (column 
I) and ex-post securitized loans (column II). The statistical significance of the difference in the coefficients on Securitized 
loan is reported. In column (III), we restrict our sample to securitized loans only, and the independent variable of interest 
is At-origination securitized loan, defined as one if the loan is securitized in the primary market (upon origination), and 
zero otherwise. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix B. Fixed effects for year of loan origination, 
Fama and French’s 12 industry portfolios, loan purpose (“financing,” “operating,” “investing,” and “other”) and loan 
arranger are included but not tabulated.  
 
In all panels we estimate OLS regressions. Coefficient t-statistics are in parentheses. Continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the borrower level. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% 
level using two-tailed tests. Coefficients of interest are in boldfaced format. 
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TABLE 6 
Covenant standardization and CLO portfolio characteristics  
 
  
 
Dep. Var.= 
Covenant similarity score  
of purchased loansq 
Variables (I) (III) (IV) 
CLO average loan holding amountq-1 -5.50***  -3.36*** 
  (-3.23)  (-2.71) 
CLO industry diversificationq-1 1.06**  0.73*** 
 (2.12)  (2.64) 
CLO portfolio turnoverq-1  0.05*** 0.05** 
   (3.25) (2.47) 
CLO overcollateralizationq-1 -0.01 -0.02*** -0.01* 
 (-1.01) (-4.21) (-1.79) 
CLO portfolio ratingq-1 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  (0.10) (0.06) (-0.14) 
CLO portfolio defaultsq-1 0.11 0.08 0.19** 
 (1.50) (1.24) (2.22) CLO balanceq-1 -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.04*** 
  (-7.24) (-3.92) (-6.20) 
Fixed effects:    
Year  Yes Yes Yes 
CLO manager  Yes Yes Yes 
CLO arranger Yes Yes Yes 
    
Adj. R2 21.87% 11.51% 22.89% 
Obs. 3,792 3,792 3,792 
 
This table reports the results of the tests on the relation between CLO portfolio characteristics and the covenant 
standardization of the loans that CLOs purchase. We use as the dependent variable the average covenant similarity of 
securitized loans purchased in a quarter (Covenant similarity of purchased loansq). We use as proxies for CLO portfolio 
structure the ratio of a loan balance in a CLO portfolio to the total CLO balance averaged at the CLO-quarter level (CLO 
average loan holding amount q-1) and the within CLO standard deviation of industry investment ratios (i.e., the number of 
loans in a Moody’s industry to the total number of loans in the CLO portfolio) averaged at the CLO-quarter level (CLO 
industry diversification q-1). We use as proxy for CLO screening costs the ratio of the total loan face amount purchased and 
sold to CLO balance at the CLO-quarter level (CLO portfolio turnoverq-1). The sample includes CLO investments in 2008-
2013. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. OLS regressions are used to estimate the models. Coefficient t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Fixed effects for year, CLO manager, and CLO arranger are also included but not tabulated. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
CLO level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at 
the 10% level using two-tailed tests. Coefficients of interest are in boldfaced format. 
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TABLE 7 
Covenant standardization and credit rating agencies’ risk assessments  
 
Panel A: Credit rating agencies issue similar ratings for securitized loans with standardized financial 
covenants 
 Dep. Var. =  
Same loan rating  
Dep. Var. =  
Loan rating difference 
Variables (I) (II) 
Covenant similarity score 0.20** -0.78**  
 (2.21) (-2.44)  
Number of covenants 0.01 -0.06**  
 (1.13) (-2.18)  
LIBOR spread -0.02 0.06   
 (-0.20) (0.48)  
Loan amount 0.05*** -0.13**  
 (2.50) (-2.16)  
Loan maturity 0.20*** -0.51** 
 (2.54) (-2.00)  
Secured -0.04 -0.15  
 (-0.53) (-0.49)  
CCC-rated and below -0.22*** 1.02*** 
 (-5.42) (7.78) 
Revolving tranche 0.01 0.05   
 (0.28) (0.45)  
Liquidity 0.02 0.02   
 (0.76) (0.24)  
ROA 0.39** -0.88**  
 (1.99) (-2.09)  
Leverage -0.10 0.12   
 (-1.06) (0.46)  
Cash flow volatility 1.35 0.05***  
 (1.41) (3.08)  
Size -0.00 0.60  
 (-0.20) (0.28)  
Fixed effects Yes             Yes 
   
Adj. R2 18.21% 33.37% 
Obs. 1,098 1,098 
 
Panel A reports the results of the tests on the relation between financial covenant standardization and S&P and Moody’s 
rating consensus for securitized loans. In column (I), the dependent variable is the probability that S&P and Moody’s 
issued the same loan rating for a securitized loan in 2008-2013, averaged at the loan-year level (Same loan rating). In 
column (II), the dependent variable is the absolute value of the average difference in loan ratings issued by S&P and 
Moody’s in 2008-2013, averaged at the loan-year level (Loan rating difference). CCC-rated and below is one if a 
securitized loan is rated CCC+ and below by at least on credit rating agency in a year, and zero otherwise. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix B. OLS regressions are used to estimate the models. Coefficient t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Fixed effects for year of loan origination, Fama and French’s 12 industry portfolios, loan purpose 
(“financing,” “operating,” “investing,” and “other”) and loan arranger are also included but not tabulated. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered 
at the borrower level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates 
significance at the 10% level using two-tailed tests. Coefficients of interest are in boldfaced format. 
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TABLE 7 (Continued) 
Panel B: Credit rating agencies issue more similar note ratings of CLOs with more 
standardized loan covenants 
 
  
Dep. Var. =  
CLO same note rating q  
Dep. Var. =  
CLO note rating 
difference q 
Variables (I) (II) 
CLO covenant similarity score q-1 -0.10 -1.10** 
  (-1.28) (-2.32) 
CLO overcollateralization q-1 0.04** -0.40*** 
 (2.29) (-4.73) 
CLO portfolio rating q-1 -0.01 0.02 
  (-0.43) (0.75) 
CLO portfolio defaults q-1 0.01 2.40*** 
 (0.17) (2.68) 
CLO balance q-1 -0.02*** -0.07** 
  (-3.62) (-2.15) 
Fixed effects:     
Year  Yes Yes 
CLO manager  Yes Yes 
CLO arranger  Yes Yes 
      
Adj. R2 34.69% 29.21% 
Obs. 5,341 5,341 
 
Panel B reports the results of the tests on the relation between CLO portfolio covenant standardization and S&P and Moody’s 
rating consensus for CLO notes. In column (I), the dependent variable is the average probability of a CLO note receiving the 
same ratings by S&P and Moody’s in 2008-2013, averaged at the CLO-quarter level (Same CLO note rating). In column (II), 
the dependent variable is the absolute value of the average difference in CLO note ratings issued by S&P and Moody’s in 
2008-2013, averaged at the CLO-quarter level (CLO note rating difference). All other variables are defined in Appendix B. 
OLS regressions are used to estimate the models. Coefficient t-statistics are in parentheses. Fixed effects for year, CLO 
manager, and CLO arranger are also included but not tabulated. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the CLO level. *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level using two-tailed tests. 
Coefficients of interest are in boldfaced format. 
 
